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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOE SUNTHIPHAB BOUPHA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040901-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his condition guilty plea to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Where both occupants of a vehicle initially deny ownership of 
marijuana and paraphernalia equally accessible to both, does the 
subsequent suspicious claim of ownership by one destroy probable 
cause to arrest the other? 
Factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, ^ f 5, 
37 P.3d 1197 (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, a trial court's 
conclusions of law based on these facts are reviewed under a correctness standard. State 
v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, \ 12, 996 P.2d 555 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are attached at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const., amend. IV; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (Supp. 2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2003); 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 23, 2003, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance 
(cocaine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and possession of a controlled substance 
(marijuana), a class B misdemeanor (Rl-2). 
After his preliminary hearing, defendant filed a motion to suppress the drugs 
underlying his felony charge (R44-55). Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 
denied defendant's motion (R83,105-08). 
On August 5, 2004, defendant entered into a conditional plea agreement in which 
he pleaded guilty to the felony charge but retained his right to appeal the trial court's 
suppression ruling (R94-99). The State dismissed the two misdemeanor counts (R100).1 
Defendant was sentenced to one to fifteen years in prison (R109-10). 
1
 During the change of plea hearing, defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an unrelated case (R94-97). 
That conviction is not at issue in this appeal. 
2 
Defendant timely appealed (Rl 12-13). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Early in the morning of July 22, 2003, Trooper Chris Jones of the Utah Highway 
Patrol initiated a traffic stop on a Nissan Maxima for speeding and a window tint 
violation (R132:3-4; R134:9-10,21). Defendant was a passenger in the vehicle, which 
was owned and operated by Adam Neusocksi (R132:4; R134:9-10,18). 
As Trooper Jones reached the vehicle, he noticed a strong odor of alcohol 
(R132:13; R134:l 1). Suspecting that Neusocksi had been driving under the influence of 
alcohol, Jones asked Neusocksi to exit the vehicle (R134:13-14). Defendant remained in 
the front passenger bucket seat (R134:15). 
After failing a field sobriety test, Neusocksi was arrested for DUI and placed in the 
back seat of Trooper Jones's patrol car (R132:4; R134:l 1,36). Trooper Jones then 
searched Neusocksi's vehicle (R132:4; R134:18). Inside the unlocked center console 
located between the front bucket seats, Jones found a marijuana pipe and a prescription 
bottle containing marijuana (R132:4-5; R134:19,21-22,34-35,74). Both items were 
sitting on top of whatever else was in the console (R106;R134:22). 
When initially asked, both Neusocksi and defendant denied possession or 
knowledge of the drugs and paraphernalia. They persisted in that denial for at least 30 
minutes (R132:6-7,14,19; R134:35). 
2
 The facts are compiled from the preliminary hearing and the evidentiary hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress. 
3 
However, during their interaction, Trooper Jones noticed that defendant's eyes 
displayed a reddening of the conjunctiva (R.132:6; R134:26). Jones, a certified drug 
recognition expert ("DRE"), recognized this condition as an indicator of recent marijuana 
use and asked to look in defendant's mouth (R134:30,41-42). Jones noticed that 
defendant's tongue had a greenish tint and that the back of defendant's tongue was 
blistered (R132:6; R134:30-31). Based on his training, Jones understood that these also 
were indicators of recent marijuana use (R134:26,53,148-50). 
In addition, during their interaction, defendant admitted to Trooper Jones that he 
had used marijuana within the last four days and that he had used methamphetamine 
within the last 24 hours (R132:18; R134:25). 
Based on the driver's and defendant's denial of any knowledge of the contraband 
found in Neusocksi's vehicle, on the multiple indicators suggesting that defendant had 
recently used marijuana, and on defendant's admission to having used marijuana within 
the last few days, Trooper Jones decided to arrest defendant for possession of drug 
paraphernalia and marijuana (R132:6-7,22; R134:35). Defendant was handcuffed and 
placed in the back of a patrol car parked directly next to Trooper Jones's patrol car, in 
which Neusocksi was sitting (R134:36). 
As Trooper Jones completed his search of Neusocksi's vehicle, Jones witnessed 
defendant and Neusocksi gesturing and mouthing words to each other through the closed 
patrol car windows (Rl34:36-37). Trooper Jones could not determine what the two were 
saying (Rl34:37). However, when Trooper Jones entered his patrol car to transport 
4 
Neusocksi to jail, Neusocksi immediately declared that the drugs and paraphernalia were 
his (R132:7,20; R134:37,80). Believing that "the driver was trying to cover for the 
passenger," Trooper Jones did not release defendant from custody after Neusocksi's 
admission but, rather, had defendant transported to the jail (R132:8-9; R134:38,81). 
At the jail, an officer conducted a more thorough search of defendant's person 
(R132:9). That search revealed that defendant was wearing two pairs of underwear 
(R132:24-25). Inside the underwear, the officer found four bags of cocaine (R132:10,12, 
24-25). 
Based on these events, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor; and possession of drug 
paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor (Rl-2). Before trial, defendant filed a motion 
to suppress the drug evidence, claiming that Trooper Jones lacked probable cause to arrest 
him for possession of the contraband found in Neusocksi's vehicle once Neusocksi 
asserted that the contraband was his (R44-55). 
At the evidentiary hearing that followed, Trooper Jones explained why he believed 
he had probable cause to arrest defendant. First, both defendant and Neusocksi initially 
denied any knowledge of the drugs. Second, sitting in the front passenger seat of 
Neusocksi's vehicle, defendant had been in very close proximity to the drugs found in the 
center console. Third, defendant admitted that, within the last four days, he had used the 
very drug found in Neusocksi's vehicle. Fourth, defendant had reddening of the 
5 
conjunctiva, a greenish tongue, and blisters at the back of his tongue—all indications, 
Jones had learned in his drug recognition course, of recent marijuana use. (R134:21,79). 
Although Trooper Jones's DRE instructor confirmed that his students were taught 
that a greenish tongue is an indicator of recent marijuana use, an expert witness called by 
defendant disputed that contention. Defendant's witnesses did agree, however, that both 
a reddening of the eyes and a blistering of the tongue were possible indicators of such use 
(R134:26,53,90,93,97,100,103,l 12,114,123-24). 
At the end of the hearing, defendant conceded that Trooper Jones had probable 
cause "to apprehend both individuals who had access to the marijuana found in the 
vehicle, especially when neither initially claimed ownership of the drugs" (R134:187). 
However, defendant argued, "[o]nce the driver of the vehicle stated that the marijuana 
and the pipe were his, the probable cause over the defendant disappeared" (R134:188, 
196). 
The trial court rejected defendant's contention. The court concluded: 
3. Trooper Jones had sufficient probable cause to arrest the 
Defendant. Pursuant to Maryland v. Pringle, [540 U.S. 366 
(2003),] the officer was justified in making the arrest given 
the denial by all parties in the car. 
4. Trooper Jones' probable cause determination does not evaporate the 
minute Nouansacksy admits to ownership of the pipe and marijuana. 
5. Trooper Jones[] had sufficient facts absent the denial to make 
a probable cause arrest—admission of use, proximity to the 
contraband and physical indications of use. 
6 
6. A reasonable police officefr] in Trooper Jones' position 
would have arrested the Defendant. 
7. Given the totality of all the facts and circumstances, the 
officer acted properly in arresting the Defendant. 
(R107 (attached at Addendum B); R134:204-07). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his suppression motion. 
Defendant admits that Trooper Jones at one point had probable cause to arrest him for 
possession of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in the center console of 
Neusocksi's vehicle. However, defendant argues that this probable cause dissipated when 
Neusocksi told Trooper Jones that the contraband was his. 
This argument rests on two false assumptions. First, it assumes that only one 
person can possess contraband at a time. Second, it assumes that, regardless of the 
suspicious circumstances accompanying a suspect's admission of criminal conduct, that 
admission nonetheless defeats any probable cause as to any other suspect even if other 
evidence implicates that second suspect. Because neither of defendant's assumptions are 
valid, defendant's claim fails. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
WHERE TWO OCCUPANTS OF A VEHICLE INITIALLY DENY 
OWNERSHIP OF MARIJUANA AND PARAPHERNALIA 
EQUALLY ACCESSIBLE TO BOTH, THE SUBSEQUENT 
SUSPICIOUS CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP BY ONE DOES NOT 
DESTROY PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST THE OTHER 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in concluding that Trooper Chris Jones 
had probable cause to arrest him for contraband found in the center console of a car in 
which he was only a passenger. Aplt. Br. at 10-22. Specifically, defendant asserts that, 
because his "red eyes and [admission] to smoking marijuana in the pas t . . . did not rise to 
the level of probable cause," any probable cause to arrest him "dissipated when the driver 
and owner of the vehicle admitted that the marijuana and paraphernalia were his." Aplt. 
Br. at 21. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless 
arrest is justified only if the arresting officer has "'probable cause . . . to believe that the 
suspect has committed or is committing an offense.'" State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, 
\ 10, 89 P.3d 185 (quoting State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, \ 26, 57 P.3d 1052) (additional 
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, "[pjrobable cause is a fluid 
concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not 
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" Maryland v. Pringle, 540 
U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). Moreover, 
"the probable-cause standard is a 'practical, nontechical conception' that deals with 'the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
8 
men, not legal technicians, act'" Id. at 370 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231) (additional 
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Thus, in determining whether probable cause exists, this Court employs "an 
'objective standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that 
can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] 
position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense' for 
which he was arrested." Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, f 10 (quoting Trane, 2002 UT 97, 
T[ 27) (brackets in original; additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Recognizing that "[a] showing of probable cause requires much less evidence than does a 
finding sufficient to convict," Bigfordv. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988), this 
Court "examine[s] the totality of the circumstances to determine whether ca prudent 
person, or one of reasonable caution, [would believe, based upon the] circumstances 
shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, the offense 
for which he is arrested." Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, <([ 11 (quoting State v. Chansamone, 
2003 UT App 107, % 11, 69 P.3d 293) (second set of brackets in original; additional 
citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and 
drug paraphernalia found in the center console of the car in which he was a passenger 
(R132:4-5; R134:9-10,18). Thus, defendant was arrested for "knowingly and 
intentionally . . . possessing] . . . a controlled substance . . . , " Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
9 
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2003), and for "possessing,] with intent to use, drug paraphernalia 
id. § 58-37a-5 (2002). 
Pursuant 1o section 58-37-2(dd) (Supp. 2003), "possession" or "use" includes 
"joint or individual ownership [or] control... of controlled substances": 
For a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is 
not required that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, 
or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the 
person jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, 
possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the 
activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a place 
or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and 
the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
Id. 
Thus, proof that the defendant was the sole possessor of the controlled substance 
or paraphernalia is not necessary to establish possession or use of that contraband. See, 
e.g., State v. Bums, 2000 UT 56, ^ 25, 4 P.3d 795 (holding that statutes are interpreted 
according to their plain language); State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, \ 9, 36 P.3d 533 
(holding that statutory terms "should be interpreted and applied according to [their] 
usually accepted meaning") (citations omitted). 
Moreover, under this definition, a defendant may be convicted based on 
constructive possession so long as "'there [was] a sufficient nexus between the accused 
and the drug [or paraphernalia] to permit an inference that the accused had both the power 
and intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug [or paraphernalia].5" State v. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, Tf 13, 985 P.2d 991 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 
10 
1985)). "Whether a sufficient nexus . . . exists depends upon the facts and circumstances 
of each case." Fox, 709 P.2d at 319; see also State v. Solas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 
App. 1991). A non-exhaustive list of relevant factors include "incriminating statements, 
suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of defendant 
to location of drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on defendant's person." Solas, 820 
P.2d at 1388; see also Layman, 1999 UT 79, \ 15. 
Finally, when drugs or paraphernalia found in a vehicle are "accessible to all [the 
vehicle's occupants]," and when, "[u]pon questioning, [all of the occupants] fail[] to offer 
any information with respect to the ownership of the [contraband]," an officer has 
probable cause to believe "that any or all [] of the occupants had knowledge of, and 
exercised dominion and control over the [contraband]." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 800-801. 
Under Pringle, Trooper Jones had probable cause to arrest both defendant and 
Neusocksi for constructive possession of the marijuana and paraphernalia found in the 
center console of Neusocksi's vehicle when "[u]pon questioning," both "failed to offer 
any information with respect to the ownership of the [contraband]." Id Defendant 
conceded as much below (R134:187). 
Thus, the only question on appeal is whether that probable cause dissipated once 
Neusocksi belatedly claimed that the contraband was his. Under the authority cited above 
and the facts of this case, it did not. 
First, the contraband was located in an area easily accessible to defendant. See 
Solas, 820 P.2d atl388. As the trial court found, "[t]he [marijuana] pipe and bottle of 
11 
marijuana were located on top of items found in the center console" (R106). As the court 
also found, "[t]he center console has a closed, unlocked lid. The console was directly 
between the driver and passenger seat" (R106). Both these findings—neither of which is 
seriously challenged on appeal3—support the trial court's conclusion that defendant's 
"proximity to the contraband" was one of the factors supporting "a probable cause arrest" 
of defendant despite Neusocksi's belated claim of ownership of the marijuana and 
paraphernalia (R107). 
Second, defendant's physical condition, as well as his own admissions, indicated 
that defendant was a user of the very drug found near him in Neusocksi's vehicle. See 
Salas, 820 P.2d all 3 88. As the trial court found, "Defendant showed signs of recent 
marijuana use—specifically reddened conjunctiva and a blistered tongue" (R106). In 
addition, "Defendant admitted to using marijuana within the past four days, and using 
methamphetamine within the past 24 hours" (R106). These findings—unchallenged on 
appeal—support the trial court's conclusion that defendant's "admission of use" and 
3Although defendant claims the trial court's finding that the contraband was 
"located on top of items found in the center console" "is clearly erroneous and . . . 
inconsistent with the Trooper's testimony," Aplt. Br. at 13, defendant's own description 
of that testimony—that the Trooper "didn't remember much being in the center console 
and . . . didn't remember having to dig for it," id.—defeats defendant's claim. See State 
v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, \ 6, 36 P.3d 533 (holding that, to challenge a trial court 
finding, "the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the [defendant] 
resists" and then show that such evidence was insufficient to support those findings); see 
also State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 
472 (Utah App. 1991); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah 
App. 1991)). 
12 
"physical indications of use" also supported "a probable cause arrest" of defendant for 
constructive possession of marijuana and paraphernalia despite Neusocksi's belated claim 
of ownership of the contraband (R107). See Salas, 820 P.2d atl388.4 
Finally, the trial court's findings show that defendant and Neusocksi did engage in 
suspicious behavior. See Salas, 820 P.2d atl388. Neither defendant nor Neusocksi 
initially "claimed ownership of the contraband," but, rather, "[e]ach persisted in the 
denial for approximately a half hour" (R106).5 Then, after defendant was arrested and 
"placed in a patrol vehicle parked next to Trooper Jones's car containing [Neusocksi] 
handcuffed in the backseat," Trooper Jones observed the two of them "communicating 
with each other by mouthing statements" (R106). Finally, "[a]s soon as Trooper Jones 
got in the driver's seat of his vehicle to take [Neusocksi] to the jail, [Neusocksi] said the 
paraphernalia and drugs belong to him" (R106). These findings, which reflect suspicious 
behavior by both defendant and Neusocksi, further support the conclusion that Trooper 
4In reaching that conclusion, the trial court specifically declined to consider any 
evidence of defendant's greenish tongue (R106 (finding insufficient "scientific proof to 
consider a greenish tinted tongue to be an indication of recent marijuana use"). 
5Although defendant challenges the trial court's finding that defendant's and 
Neusocksi's denial persisted for a half hour, see Aplt. Br. at 13, he fails to marshal all of 
the evidence supporting the trial court's finding as required. See Coonce, 2001 UT App 
355, \ 6. Specifically, defendant fails to marshal Trooper Jones's testimony that, during 
the thirty-minute period at issue, Jones "had contact with [Neusocksi] several times 
[because] I have to get in and out of my car to get forms and . . . . " (R134:80). Because 
this testimony indicates that Neusocksi had multiple opportunities to admit ownership of 
the contraband during the 30 minutes following his arrest, this evidence supports the trial 
court's finding that Neusocki persisted in denying ownership for those 30 minutes. Thus, 
defendant's challenge to that finding fails. See Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, % 6; see also 
Vessey, 967 P.2d at 966; Scheel, 823 P.2d at 472; Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. 
13 
Jones had probable cause to arrest defendant for constructive possession of the marijuana 
and paraphernalia despite Neusocksi's belated claim of ownership of the contraband. See 
Sa/ay, 820P.2datl388. 
All of this evidence, and the inferences that can be drawn therefrom, support 
Trooper Jones's conclusion that defendant had committed the offenses for which he was 
arrested. See Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ^ 10. Thus, the trial court properly denied 
defendant's claim that Trooper Jones lacked probable cause to arrest him. 
Defendant's citations to State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, 89 P.3d 185, and 
United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), do not alter that conclusion. 
Hechtle was driving when his car was stopped for speeding. 2004 UT App 96, % 2. 
The officer effecting the stop noticed multiple air fresheners in Hechtle's car. Id. at f^ 12. 
The officer then noticed that Hechtle's eyes were dilated, droopy, and red, and "that 
Hechtle's tongue was 'very green' with 'blisters all over the back of it.'" Id. at \ 4. Based 
on these observations, the officer concluded "that Hechtle had been smoking marijuana" 
and arrested Hechtle for "driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body." 
Id. at TI114, 5. Hechtle was subsequently charged with other crimes based on evidence 
found during a search incident to arrest. Id. 
On appeal, Hechtle argued that the officer lacked "probable cause to believe [he] 
was driving with any measurable controlled substance in his body." Id. at % 9. This Court 
agreed. Id. at 13. In reaching that conclusion, this Court noted first that the arresting 
officer was not a drug recognition expert. Id. at 13 n.3. This Court noted second that, 
14 
although multiple air fresheners and red eyes "can support, when viewed in conjunction 
with other factors, the existence of a reasonable suspicion of drug use , . . . the State has 
presented nothing, no scientific studies and no case law or other authority, to support the 
reliability of the trooper's concern regarding the condition of Hechtle's tongue." Id. at 
f 13. Finally, this Court noted that, "[e]ven if we were persuaded . . . that the condition of 
Hechtle's eyes and tongue are presumptively suggestive of marijuana use, nothing in the 
record indicates either how long these conditions are sustained or how long measurable 
quantities of marijuana remains in the system as required by the statute [defining this 
crime]." Id. at Tf 16. 
In this case, unlike in Hechtle, State witnesses testified—and defendant's experts 
agreed—that red eyes and blistered tongues may be indicative of recent marijuana use. In 
addition, unlike the officer in Hechtle, Trooper Jones was a DRE; thus, Trooper Jones's 
training allowed him to place more weight than could the officer in Hechtle on 
defendant's red eyes and blistered tongue as signifying recent marijuana use. 
More importantly, however, the crime for which Hechtle had been arrested was 
driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body. Probable cause to arrest 
Hechtle for that crime required some evidence indicating that Hechtle had a measurable 
controlled substance in his body at the time he was observed driving his car. 
In contrast, defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance and 
paraphernalia, not for having it inside his body. Thus, although evidence that defendant 
had recently used the controlled substance helped establish probable cause to arrest him, 
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evidence that defendant actually had a measurable amount of the controlled substance in 
his body at the time of his arrest was not necessary. Consequently, Hechtle's concern that 
"nothing in the record indicates either how long these conditions are sustained or how 
long measurable quantities of marijuana remains in the system," Hechtle, 2004 UT App 
96, Tf 16, is inapposite. Such evidence is simply not dispositive in a drug possession case. 
The lack of such evidence, therefore, does nothing to undermine the conclusion that 
probable cause existed here to believe that defendant possessed the marijuana and 
paraphernalia. 
DiRe is also distinguishable. In that case, the government received information 
from an informant that a specific person had counterfeit gasoline ration coupons. Di Re, 
332 U.S. at 583. Based on that information, the government set up a sting operation to 
catch the named suspect in the act of distributing counterfeit coupons. Id. Di Re was 
arrested merely because he was with the suspect at the time the sting was executed. Id. at 
592-94. 
On appeal, Di Re asserted that the government lacked probable cause to arrest him. 
Id. at 583-84. The supreme court agreed, holding that, absent any other evidence 
connecting a person to the crime, "[a]ny inference that everyone on the scene of a crime is 
a party to it must disappear if the Government informer singles out the guilty person." Id. 
at 594. 
In this case, the only person singling out a specific person was defendant's friend, 
Neusocksi, who did so under highly suspicious circumstances (R134:36-37,80). 
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Moreover, Trooper Jones had other evidence supporting a probable cause belief that 
defendant possessed the marijuana and paraphernalia in Neusocksi's vehicle (R132:6; 
Rl34:26,30-31). Thus, unlike in Di Re, Trooper Jones did not rely solely on defendant's 
presence in Neusocksi's vehicle to support defendant's arrest. Finally, where the statutes 
proscribing possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia recognize that more 
than one person can jointly possess that contraband, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(ff), 
Trooper Jones was not required to ignore other evidence indicating defendant's 
ownership in the contraband just because Neusocksi told Jones that the contraband was 
his. 
In sum, the totality of the circumstances in this case established probable cause to 
arrest defendant for possession of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia found in 
Neusocksi's vehicle. Thus, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress 
the cocaine found on defendant after he was arrested. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED itf November 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KARENA.KLUCZNIjfC 
Assistant Attorney General 
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A m e n d m e n t IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
58-37-2. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled substance, 
whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to the 
body of a patient or research subject by: 
(i) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or 
(ii) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the 
presence of the practitioner. 
(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the 
direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or practitioner but does not 
include a motor carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of any of them. 
(c) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, sole propri-
etorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other 
legal entity, and any union or groups of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities 
created or maintained for the purpose of engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of episodes of activity made unlawful by Title 
58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, which episodes are not isolated, but 
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods 
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing character-
istics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful 
conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. 
(d) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug, 
substance, or immediate precursor under Section 58-37-3. 
(e) (i) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance included in 
Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a 
drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513, or any 
controlled substance analog. 
(ii) "Controlled substance" does not include: 
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms 
are defined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food; 
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudo-
ephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully pur-
chased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription; or 
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other 
similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are 
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally 
occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this chap-
ter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(f) (i) "Controlled substance analog" means a substance the chemical 
structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of 
a controlled substance listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, 
or in Schedules I and II of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title 
II, P.L. 91-513: 
(A) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect 
on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stim-
ulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous 
system of controlled substances in the schedules set forth in this 
subsection; or 
(B) which, with respect to a particular individual, is repre-
sented or intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucino-
genic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to 
the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central 
nervous system of controlled substances in the schedules set forth 
in this subsection, 
(ii) Controlled substance analog does not include: 
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled in Schedules I 
through V of Section 58-37-4; 
(B) a substance for which there is an approved new drug 
application; 
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is in effect 
for investigational use by a particular person under Section 505 of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 366, to the extent the 
conduct with respect to the substance is permitted by the exemp-
tion; or 
(D) any substance to the extent not intended for human 
consumption before an exemption takes effect with respect to the 
substance. 
(E) Any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudo-
ephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully pur-
chased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter 
medication without prescription. 
(F) Dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other 
similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are 
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally 
occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this chap-
ter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(g) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by verdict, whether jury 
or bench, or plea, whether guilty or no contest, for any offense proscribed 
by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or for any offense under the 
laws of the United States and any other state which, if committed in this 
state, would be an offense under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 
37d. 
(h) "Counterfeit substance" means: 
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that 
without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of 
a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than the person or 
persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the 
substance which falsely purports to be a controlled substance distrib-
uted by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or 
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance, 
(i) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or not an 
agency relationship exists, 
(j) "Department" means the Department of Commerce, 
(k) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means: 
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any of 
the salts of barbituric acid; 
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of: 
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers; 
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of 
amphetamine; or 
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services or the Attorney General of the United States after 
investigation has found and by regulation designated habit-
forming because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous 
system; or 
(hi) lysergic acid diethylamide; or 
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of 
the United States after investigation has found to have, and by 
regulation designated as having, a potential for abuse because of its 
depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its 
hallucinogenic effect. 
(1) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled substance by a phar-
macist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order or prescription of 
a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or 
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging, labeling, or com-
pounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery. 
(m) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a controlled sub-
stance. 
(n) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dis-
pensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical, 
(o) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled substances, 
(p) "Drug" means: 
(i) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, 
Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or Official 
National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them; 
(ii) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; 
(hi) articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or 
function of man or other animals; and 
(iv) articles intended for use as a component of any articles speci-
fied in Subsection (l)(p)(i), (ii), or (hi); but does not include devices or 
their components, parts, or accessories, 
(q) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully and 
habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger the public morals, 
health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of controlled 
substances as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his 
dependency. 
(r) "Food" means: 
(i) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or animal origin 
other than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally ingested 
by human beings; and 
(ii) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical, 
physiological, pathological, or other condition including but not lim-
ited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, 
allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and overweight; uses 
for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age 
including but not limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and 
also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual 
diet with any vitamin, mineral, or other dietary property for use of a 
food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use regardless of 
the nutritional purposes. 
(s) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney 
General of the United States has found to be, and by regulation designated 
as being, the principal compound used or produced primarily for use in the 
manufacture of a controlled substance, or which is an immediate chemical 
intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled 
substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the 
manufacture of the controlled substance. 
(t) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, 
compounding, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or 
indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or indepen-
dently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction 
and chemical synthesis. 
(u) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or 
labels any container of any controlled substance, except pharmacists who 
dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate 
consumer. 
(v) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis and all parts of 
the genus, whether growing or not; the seeds of it; the resin extracted from 
any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term does not 
include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil 
or cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufac-
ture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks, except 
the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the 
plant which is incapable of germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the 
substances contained in the plant cannabis sativa or any other species of 
the genus cannabis which are chemically indistinguishable and pharma-
cologically active are also included. 
(w) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of the United 
States or any foreign country. 
(x) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced 
directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or 
independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of 
extraction and chemical synthesis: 
(i) opium, coca leaves, and opiates; 
(ii) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of 
opium, coca leaves, or opiates; 
(hi) opium poppy and poppy straw; or 
(iv) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
or preparation of the substance, which is chemically identical with 
any of the substances referred to in Subsection (l)(x)(i), (ii), or (hi), 
except narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca leaves or 
extracts of coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine. 
(y) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an uncondi-
tional promise to pay a sum of money, which are legally transferable to 
another party by endorsement or delivery. 
(z) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-
forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to morphine or being 
capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-
sustaining liability. 
(aa) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species papaver somniferum 
L., except the seeds of the plant. 
(bb) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, 
other institution or entity or one or more individuals. 
(cc) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium 
poppy, after mowing. 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distin-
guished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes individ-
ual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a person 
to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that 
he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the 
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it. 
(ee) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharma-
cist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, 
registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct re-
search with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis 
a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in 
this state. 
(ff) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or in writing. 
(gg) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed practitioner, in 
the course of that practitioner's professional practice, for a controlled 
substance, other drug, or device which it dispenses or administers for use 
by a patient or an animal. The order may be issued by word of mouth, 
written document, telephone, facsimile transmission, computer, or other 
electronic means of communication as defined by rule. 
(hh) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, grow-
ing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. 
(ii) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
debt or of property. 
(jj) "State" means the state of Utah. 
(kk) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a 
controlled substance for his own use, for the use of a member of his 
household, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member 
of his household. 
(2) If a term used in this chapter is not defined, the definition and terms of 
Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, shall apply. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct 
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more 
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on 
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or 
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position 
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance 
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is 
guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined 
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the 
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a 
term of one year to rim consecutively and not concurrently; and the court 
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a 
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term 
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended,,and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practi-
tioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as 
otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; or 
(hi) for any peison knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a 
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in 
an offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally 
having in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; 
and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a 
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 
76-1-601 or the death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
this Subsection (4) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary insti-
tution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 
76-10-501; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of 
age, regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years 
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this 
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution 
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), 
a person convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty 
of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance 
or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act whov> 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Addendum B 
BRENDA J. BEATON, UBN 6832 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOE SUNTHIPHAB BOUPHA, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 031903714 ^ 
*0X 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
This Court, having considered the motions, testimony and legal arguments, hereby denies 
the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court makes the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On July 22, 2003, Trooper Chris Jones of the Utah Highway Patrol ("Trooper Jones") 
stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding and excess window tinting. The vehicle was 
registered to Adam Nouansacksy ("Nouansacksy"). 
2. The driver of the vehicle, Nouansacksy, displayed signs of alcohol impairment, Trooper 
Jones had Nouansacksy perform field sobriety tests. 
3. Nouansacksy was arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
4. Nouansacksy did not exhibit any physical signs of drug usage. 
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5. Trooper Jones searched Nouansacksy's vehicle. The search yielded a marijuana pipe and 
a prescription bottle containing marijuana in the vehicle's center console. 
6. The pipe and bottle of marijuana were located on top of items found in the center console. 
7. The center console has a closed, unlocked lid. The console was directly between the 
driver and passenger seat. 
8. Trooper Jones questioned both Nouansacksy and the passenger, Defendant, but neither 
claimed ownership of the contraband. Each persisted in the denial for approximately a 
half hour. 
9. In questioning Defendant, Trooper Jones observed that Defendant showed signs of recent 
marijuana use-specifically reddened conjunctiva and a blistered tongue. 
10. This Court does not find sufficient scientific proof to consider a greenish tinted tongue to 
be an indication of recent marijuana use. 
11. Trooper Jones is a certified Drug Recognition Expert. 
12. Also, Defendant admitted to using marijuana within the past four days, and using 
methamphetamine within the past 24 hours. 
13. The Defendant was arrested for Possession of Paraphernalia and Possession of Marijuana. 
14. The Defendant was placed in a patrol vehicle parked next to Trooper Jones' car 
containing Nouansacksy handcuffed in the backseat. 
15. While the Defendant and Nouansacksy were parked next to each other, they were 
communicating with each other by mouthing statements. Trooper Jones was not able to 
determine what the two were discussing. 
16. As soon as Trooper Jones got in the driver's seat of his vehicle to take Nouansacksy to 
the jail, Nouansacksy said the paraphernalia and drugs belong to him. 
I C G 
Trooper Jones did not change his mind about arresting the Defendant. 
The Defendant was taken to the jail. While there, he was searched and a large quantity of 
cocaine was found in his underwear. 
The Defendant never requested to leave the scene while Trooper Jones was conducting 
his DUI investigation on Nouansacksy. 
The Defendant was never ordered to remain at the scene during the parallel investigation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The initial stop was justified because Trooper Jones observed traffic violations. 
The Defendant was not illegally detained. 
Trooper Jones had sufficient probable cause to arrest the Defendant. Pursuant to 
Maryland v. Pringle, the officer was justified in making the arrest given the denial by all 
parties in the car. 
Trooper Jones' probable cause determination does not evaporate the minute Nouansacksy 
admits to ownership of the pipe and marijuana. 
Trooper Jones' had sufficient facts absent the denial to make a probable cause 
arrest-admission of use, proximity to the contraband and physical indications of use. 
A reasonable police office in Trooper Jones' position would have arrested the Defendant. 
Given the totality of all the facts and circumstances, the officer acted properly in arresting 
the Defendant. 
this J_J_ day o^Sy, 2004. 
JUDGE PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
Second Judicial District Court 
Approved as to form: 
BRENDA J. BEATON 
Deputy Weber Ccninty Attorney 
Q/ze/o^ 
JAMES RETALLICK 
Attorney for Defendant 
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